02 - Platform observability, security, and conformance¶
Domain 2: Platform Observability, Security, and Conformance (20%)
Two kinds of observability¶
A platform has both, and the exam distinguishes them:
- Observability of the platform: is the platform itself healthy? Provisioning latency, API availability, delivery pipeline success rate, control plane health. Measured against platform SLOs.
- Observability as a capability: what the platform gives tenants so their workloads are observable by default. Automatic metrics scraping, log shipping, trace collection, and dashboards a team gets without configuring anything.
The second is a golden path in its own right. A platform where each team must wire up its own telemetry has not reduced cognitive load.
OpenTelemetry is the standard collection layer, which is why OTCA knowledge composes with this exam.
Platform SLOs should describe capabilities users care about: "a namespace claim is fulfilled within 5 minutes, 99% of the time", not "the controller pod is up".
Multi-tenancy¶
The isolation spectrum, weakest to strongest:
| Model | Boundary | Trade-off | Fits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Namespace per tenant | Kubernetes API objects, RBAC, quotas | Shared control plane, shared nodes, shared kernel | Trusted internal teams |
| Node pool per tenant | Workloads on dedicated nodes | Higher cost, still one control plane | Compliance-sensitive workloads |
| Virtual control plane (vCluster and similar) | A per-tenant API server on shared infrastructure | Logical isolation, shared physical resources | Many tenants needing cluster-level API access |
| Cluster per tenant | Full separation | Highest cost and operational load | Regulatory boundaries, untrusted code |
Namespace isolation is not a security boundary against hostile code, because the kernel and control plane are shared. Untrusted workloads need at least node-level separation and usually a sandboxed runtime such as gVisor or Kata Containers.
Align the isolation boundary with the compliance boundary so that audit scoping is straightforward.
Tenant isolation controls¶
- RBAC scoped to the tenant's namespaces
- ResourceQuota and LimitRange so one tenant cannot exhaust the cluster
- NetworkPolicy default-deny between tenants
- Admission control enforcing what may be created
- PriorityClass governance so tenants cannot self-elevate scheduling priority
- Runtime isolation where the workload is untrusted
Policy as code and conformance¶
Conformance is the platform's mechanism for guaranteeing that what runs on it meets requirements.
Policy engines: - Kyverno - Kubernetes-native, policies written as YAML resources. Lower learning curve - OPA Gatekeeper - policies in Rego, more expressive, steeper learning curve
Both operate as admission controllers, so enforcement happens before a resource is persisted, and both support validate, mutate, and generate behaviors. Mutation is useful for a platform: default a missing security context or inject a required label rather than rejecting the request.
Rollout discipline: audit mode first, publish violations to teams, provide a compliant golden path, then enforce. Enforcing on day one breaks delivery and costs the platform its goodwill.
Enforcement point matters. A CI-only check is bypassable by anyone who deploys outside the pipeline. Admission control is the enforcement point because everything reaching the cluster passes through it.
Supply chain security¶
The platform is the natural place to enforce supply chain requirements once, for everyone:
- Image signing with Sigstore and cosign, verified at admission
- Provenance attestation linking an image to the source and build that produced it, aligned to SLSA levels
- SBOM generation and storage per artifact
- Vulnerability scanning at build and continuously in the registry
- Registry allowlisting, so only approved registries may be pulled from
- Base image curation, so the golden path includes a maintained, minimal base
The platform's advantage is uniformity: one policy covers every workload, and the evidence is produced automatically.
Secrets¶
Multi-tenant secret management patterns: - External store (Vault, cloud secret managers) with per-tenant paths and policies - External Secrets Operator so tenants reference secrets without them entering Git - Workload identity so applications authenticate to cloud services without any stored credential at all - Per-tenant encryption keys where the compliance posture requires separation
The platform should make the secure pattern the default, so a tenant does not have to know why a Kubernetes Secret alone is insufficient.
Compliance evidence¶
A mature platform produces compliance evidence as a by-product rather than through manual collection: policy decisions logged, admission denials recorded, provenance stored, and access audited. Auditors query the platform instead of asking forty teams for screenshots.
This is a strong argument for platform investment and a recurring exam theme.
Key terms¶
- Platform SLO - a service level objective describing a platform capability from the user's perspective
- Observability as a capability - telemetry a tenant receives by default without configuring it
- Namespace tenancy - the lightest multi-tenancy model, appropriate for trusted internal tenants
- Virtual control plane - a per-tenant API server on shared infrastructure, giving cluster-level access without a full cluster
- Sandboxed runtime - a container runtime such as gVisor or Kata Containers providing stronger isolation for untrusted code
- ResourceQuota - the Kubernetes object limiting aggregate resource consumption within a namespace
- Conformance - validation that workloads and clusters meet the platform's stated requirements
- Policy as code - expressing organizational rules as machine-enforced policy, typically at admission
- Kyverno - a Kubernetes-native policy engine with policies written as YAML resources
- OPA Gatekeeper - a policy engine using Rego, offering greater expressiveness
- Admission controller - the Kubernetes component validating or mutating resources before they are persisted
- Audit mode - a policy rollout state that records violations without blocking them
- Provenance attestation - signed metadata linking an artifact to the source and build process that produced it
- SBOM - a software bill of materials enumerating the components inside an artifact
- Registry allowlist - a policy restricting which container registries images may be pulled from
- Compliance evidence - audit artifacts produced automatically by the platform rather than collected manually
Related¶
- Notes 03: delivery, APIs, and provisioning
- Scenarios - scenarios 2 and 7
- AI security - supply chain thinking applied to models