AI security¶
Securing systems with a language model in the request path. Classic appsec still applies; what is new is a component that reads untrusted natural language, decides what to do at inference time, and can be talked into doing something else.
flowchart LR
subgraph sources[Context sources - mixed trust]
U[User message]
D[Retrieved docs]
W[Fetched pages]
T[Tool output]
end
sources --> M[Model]
M --> TB{Tool boundary<br/>authz on user identity}
TB -- denied --> AUD[Audit + alert]
TB -- allowed --> ACT[Scoped action]
M --> OUT[Output] --> SAN[Treat as untrusted input]
SAN --> DOWN[Renderer, DB, shell, another agent] The two boxes that carry the weight: the context window, where untrusted text mixes with your instructions, and the tool boundary, the last non-model control that can refuse.
Learn¶
- Prompt injection explained - why it exists, why filters do not fix it
- AI threat modeling - three questions that surface most of the risk
- Guardrails and safety - the control layer around the model
- Tool use and function calling - the mechanism agents act through
- Agentic loops - why autonomy multiplies blast radius
- Evals for LLMs - measuring safety regressions, not just accuracy
Reference¶
- AI security hub - the full engineering-depth set
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications - the risk taxonomy, entry by entry
- Prompt injection defense - direct and indirect injection, what actually works
- Agent and tool security - least privilege for agents, sandboxing, audit
- Model supply chain security - provenance, weight integrity, AI-BOM
- LLM red teaming - adversarial testing method and metrics
Govern¶
- EU AI Act - risk tiers, provider vs deployer, timelines
- NIST AI RMF - Govern, Map, Measure, Manage
- ISO/IEC 42001 - the certifiable AI management system
- GDPR - applies independently to any personal data in the pipeline
- SOC 2 - the service controls an AI feature inherits
Build¶
- Set up an eval harness - including injection and safety regression tests
- Build a RAG pipeline - the retrieval layer indirect injection targets
- Build a Claude agent with MCP - tool boundaries in practice
- Implement zero trust - the identity model agents belong inside
Certify¶
No certification covers this end to end yet. Closest coverage, in rough order of relevance:
AI-specific - AWS GenAI Developer Professional (AIP-C01) - dedicated AI safety, security, and governance domain - AWS AI Practitioner (AIF-C01) - responsible AI at foundational depth - Azure AI Engineer (AI-102) - Content Safety and responsible AI tooling - NVIDIA GenAI and LLMs Associate - ethics and responsible AI domain - Oracle OCI Generative AI Professional - securing GenAI workloads on OCI
Cloud security foundations the AI controls sit on - Microsoft Cybersecurity Architect (SC-100) - designing the security strategy AI systems live inside - Microsoft Information Security Administrator (SC-401) - Purview DSPM for AI, data protection for Copilot - Cloud Security Alliance CCSK - cloud governance - ISC2 CCSP - cloud security architecture at depth - AWS Security Specialty (SCS-C02) - IAM and detection controls agents inherit
Offensive method - OSCP (PEN-200) - the testing mindset red teaming borrows
Roadmap¶
Security path: Security Engineer roadmap. AI path: AI/ML Engineer roadmap. This topic sits at the intersection, and no single roadmap owns it yet.